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IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY COOPERATION
THROUGH INFLATION TARGETING
GIANLUCA BENIGNO
London School of Economics
PIERPAOLO BENIGNO
Luiss Guido Carli
This paper presents a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with imperfect
competition and nominal price rigidities in which productivity shocks coexist with
markup shocks. After analyzing the features of the optimal cooperative solution, we show
that this allocation can be implemented in a strategic context through inflation-targeting
regimes. Under these regimes, each monetary authority minimizes a quadratic loss
function that targets only domestic targets, namely, GDP inflation and the output gap.
Keywords: International Monetary Cooperation, Inflation Targeting
In this paper, we examine the international monetary policy design problem in a
simple two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with imperfect compe-
tition, nominal price rigidities and producer currency pricing. As discussed in a
related work [Benigno and Benigno (2005)], the structure of the model allows for
gains from international monetary policy cooperation. The focus in this work is
to study if it is possible to design institutions that can implement the cooperative
allocation. In Benigno and Benigno (2005), we have shown how to design targeting
rules—that is, linear combinations of target variables. Here we study how flexible
inflation targeting policies [see Svensson (2002)] could be adopted in a framework
in which policy makers still interact strategically.
There are two classes of exogenous disturbances in the model, productivity and
markup shocks. Following markup shocks, we describe two possible transmission
mechanisms whose operation depends on the values of key structural parameters;
a “positive-correlated” scenario in which markup shocks generate comovement
of inflation rates across countries, and a “negative-correlated” scenario in which
inflation rates move in opposite directions.
In analyzing the implementation of the cooperative allocation, our main finding
is that is sufficient for this purpose that each policy maker commits to minimize
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a quadratic loss function that appropriately weighs only domestic targets—the
output gap and the domestic producer inflation rate. Our model supports the
adoption of flexible inflation-targeting regimes [see Svensson (2002)], even in an
international context.
Furthermore, the design of the relative weights in the objective functions of
the monetary policy makers depends on the scenario that we consider. Under a
“positive-correlated scenario,” it is optimal to design institutions with a relatively
higher weight on the domestic output gap in order to correct for the “contrac-
tionary bias” that would arise in a strategic framework. By contrast, in the “neg-
ative correlated scenario” the corresponding “expansionary bias” should be cor-
rected by assigning a higher relative weight to domestic producer inflation in both
countries.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 presents the model and Section
2 the log-linear approximation of the structural equilibrium conditions. Section 3
studies the cooperative solution. Section 4 shows how to implement the cooperative
solution in a decentralized context. Section 5 concludes.
1. THE MODEL
In this section, we present our two-country dynamic general equilibrium model
with imperfect competition and nominal price rigidities along the lines of
Benigno and Benigno (2002, 2005), Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002), and
Svensson (2000).
1.1. Households’ Preferences
We consider a two-country economy, Home (H ) and Foreign (F ). The population
on the segment [0, n) belongs to the Home country whereas the one on the segment
[n, 1] belongs to the Foreign country. Each individual maximizes the following
utility function:
U
j
t = Et
{ ∞∑
s=t
βs−t [U(Cjs )− V (ys(j), ξY,s)]
}
,
where the index j denotes a variable that is specific to household j ; Et denotes the
expectation conditional on the information set at date t , whileβ is the intertemporal
discount factor, with 0 <β < 1. Individuals obtain utility from consumption while
they receive disutility from producing a single differentiated good, which is subject
to a country-specific shock, ξY , that we interpret as a productivity shock. Country’s
F variables are denoted with a star index. U is an increasing concave function of
the index Cj defined as
Cj ≡
[
n
1
θ
(
C
j
H
) θ−1
θ + (1 − n) 1θ (CjF ) θ−1θ ] θθ−1 ,
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where CjH and C
j
F are consumption subindexes of the continuum of differentiated
goods produced, respectively, in country H and F :
C
j
H ≡
[(
1
n
) 1
σ
∫ n
o
cj (h)
σ−1
σ dh
] σ
σ−1
, C
j
F ≡
[(
1
1 − n
) 1
σ
∫ 1
n
cj (f )
σ−1
σ df
] σ
σ−1
,
where σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across goods produced within a country
and θ is the elasticity of substitution between the bundles CH and CF ; n is a
parameter such that 0 ≤ n≤ 1.
P denotes the consumption-based price index associated with C, defined as
P ≡ [n(PH )1−θ + (1 − n)(PF )1−θ ] 11−θ ,
with
PH ≡
[(
1
n
)∫ n
o
p(h)1−σ dh
] 1
1−σ
, PF ≡
[(
1
1 − n
)∫ 1
n
p(f )1−σ df
] 1
1−σ
,
where p(h) and p(f ) are prices in units of domestic currency of the Home-
produced and Foreign-produced goods, respectively.
All consumption goods are traded. Prices are set in the currency of the producer
and the law of one price holds: p(h)= S ·p∗(h) and p(f )= S ·p∗(f ), where S
is the nominal exchange rate (the price of foreign currency in terms of domestic
currency). Given these assumptions and the structure of preferences, purchasing
power parity holds, that is, P = S ·P ∗. The terms of trade are defined as the relative
price of foreign goods in terms of home goods expressed in the domestic currency,
that is, T ≡ PF
PH
.
1
Finally, V is an increasing convex function of household j ’s supply of the
differentiated good y(j).
Total demands of the home and foreign differentiated goods are then given by
yd(h) =
[
p(h)
PH
]−σ (
PH
P
)−θ
CW, yd(f ) =
[
p(f )
PF
]−σ (
PF
P
)−θ
CW, (1)
where CW is the aggregate consumption in the whole economy. Applying the
appropriate aggregate operators we obtain the domestic and foreign aggregate
demand as
YH =
(
PH
P
)−θ
CW , YF =
(
PF
P
)−θ
CW . (2)
From (2), it follows that changes in the terms of trade create dispersion of output
across countries.
As in Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002), we assume that markets are complete
both at a domestic and international level so that households have access to a
complete set of state-contingent one-period nominal securities denominated in the
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currency of the Home country. Along with the assumption that initial wealth is
identical among all the household, it follows that marginal utilities of income are
equalized across and within countries at all times and across all states of nature:
UC(Ct) = UC(C∗t ) (3)
Equation (3) is derived from the set of optimality conditions that characterize the
optimal allocation of wealth among the state-contingent securities.
Our model is in the class of the cashless-limiting economies discussed in
Woodford (2003).
1.2. Price-Setting Behavior
Each producer of a single differentiated good acts in a monopolistic-competitive
market. The demand of the differentiated good, (1), depends on the pricing decision
p(h), for the generic home-produced good, and p∗(f ), for the foreign-produced
good, respectively.2 By contrast, producers take as given P,PH , PF , and C. The
price-setting behavior is modeled following the Calvo-Yun partial adjustment rule,
under which each producer has the opportunity to change its price with a fixed
probability 1 − α at each point in time.3 We allow this probability to be different
across countries.
A home producer, that sets a new price in period t , maximizes the expected
discounted value of her net profits4
Et
∞∑
k=0
(αβ)k
{
UC(Ct+k)
Pt+k
(1 − τt+k)p˜t (h)y˜t,t+k(h) − V (y˜t,t+k(h), ξY,t+k)
}
,
where τt is a time-varying tax on firms’ revenues. With p˜t (h), we have denoted
the price of the good h chosen at date t and with y˜t,t+k(h) the total demand of
good h at time t + k conditional on the fact that the price p˜t (h) has not changed,
y˜t,t+k(h) =
[
p˜t (h)
PH,t+k
]−σ[(
PH,t+k
Pt+k
)−θ
Ct+k
]
. (4)
The optimal choice of p˜t (h) is
p˜t (h) = Et
∑∞
k=0(α
iβ)kVy(y˜t,t+k(h), ξY,t+k)y˜t,t+k(h)
Et
∑∞
k=0(αiβ)k (1 − µt+k) UC(Ct+k)Pt+k y˜t,t+k(h)
, (5)
where
(1 − µt) ≡ (1 − τt )(σ − 1)
σ
.
The Calvo-style price-setting mechanism implies the following state equation for
PH,t :
(PH,t )
1−σ = α(PH,t−1)1−σ + (1 − α)p˜t (h)1−σ . (6)
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2. LOG-LINEAR APPROXIMATION TO THE EQUILIBRIUM
CONDITIONS
We log-linearize the model around the deterministic steady state in which mo-
nopolistic distortions are eliminated by a taxation subsidy, that is, µ¯= 1. By log-
linearizing (5), (6), and their foreign correspondents, we obtain the two aggregate
supply (AS) equations for the Home and Foreign country:
πH,t = κ[( ˆYH,t − ˜YH,t ) + (1 − n)ψ( ˆTt − ˜Tt ) + ut ] + βEtπH,t+1, (7)
π∗F,t = κ∗[( ˆY ∗F,t − ˜YF,t ) − nψ( ˆTt − ˜Tt ) + u∗t ] + βEtπ∗F,t+1, (8)
where κi ≡ (1 − αi)(1 − αiβ)(ρ + η)/[αi(1 + ση)] and ψ ≡ (1 − ρθ)/(ρ + η).
Variables with the hat denotes log-deviations of the respective variable from the
steady-state value (T̂t , ˆYH,t , and ˆY ∗F,t are the deviation of the terms of trade,
domestic, and foreign output from their steady state.5), whereas we have defined
πH,t ≡ ln H,t , π∗F,t ≡ ln ∗F,t and Tt =PF,t/PH,t . The variables ˜Ct, ˜Tt , ˜YH,t , ˜YF,t
are the following functions of the shocks:6
˜Ct ≡ η
(η + ρ) aˆW,t ,
˜Tt = η
(1 + θη) aˆR,t , (9)
˜YH,t ≡ ˜Ct + (1 − n)θ ˜Tt , ˜YF,t ≡ ˜Ct − nθ ˜Tt , (10)
with aˆR,t ≡ aˆt − aˆ∗t and aˆW,t ≡ naˆt + (1 − n)aˆ∗t . In what follows we will refer to
˜Tt as a terms of trade shock (a combination of the Home and Foreign productivity
shocks). More important, ut and u∗t represent inefficient supply shocks that capture
the deviations of the flexible-price allocation from the efficient allocation [for the
case in which µ¯= 1, the efficient allocation for the respective variables is charac-
terized by equations (9) to (10)]. In our context, these deviations are produced by
variations in the distortionary taxes that apply to the firms’ revenues. In particular,
in equations (7) and (8) ut and u∗t are just proportional to the markup shocks:
ut = µˆt
(η + ρ) , u
∗
t =
µˆ∗t
(η + ρ) . (11)
In the AS equations (7) and (8), GDP inflation rates depend on the present dis-
counted value of the aggregate real marginal costs. In general, in open economies,
real marginal costs are not only proportional to the output gap, but they also
depend on the terms of trade [see Svensson (2000)]. This dependence captures the
expenditure-switching effect; only in the special case in which ρθ = 1 the terms
of trade channel disappears.
Finally, after log-linearizing equations (2), we obtain that the terms of trade
reflect also the differential in the countries’ output gaps:
( ˆTt − ˜Tt ) = θ−1[( ˆYH,t − ˜YH,t ) − ( ˆY ∗F,t − ˜YF,t )]. (12)
50 GIANLUCA BENIGNO AND PIERPAOLO BENIGNO
Using the definition of the terms of trade, we can decompose the changes in the
terms of trade between the nominal exchange rate depreciation and the producers’
inflation rate differential
T̂t = T̂t−1 + St + π∗F,t − πH,t , (13)
where St = ln St/St−1.
3. OPTIMAL COOPERATIVE SOLUTION
In this section, we characterize the efficient response of macroeconomic variables
to the various shocks that affect the economy, whether in the form of terms of
trade or inefficient supply shocks. This problem has been extensively studied
in the Keynesian literature on international monetary cooperation [see Canzoneri
and Henderson (1991) and Persson and Tabellini (1996)]. Importantly, we propose
both a microfounded model and a welfare criterion, based directly on consumers’
utility.7
Our welfare criterion for characterizing the cooperative allocation is represented
by the utility of the agents belonging to the world economy. As in Woodford (2003),
we rely on a quadratic approximation of the utility-based welfare criterion, so that
our framework becomes comparable to the linear-quadratic models that have been
extensively used in the Keynesian literature.
The quadratic approximation of the welfare criterion is taken around the steady
state in which the taxation subsidy completely offsets the monopolistic distor-
tions in both countries [as in P. Benigno (2004)]. We obtain the following loss
function:
LC = (ρ + η)E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
n( ˆYH,t − ˜YH,t )2 + (1 − n)( ˆY ∗F,t − ˜YF,t )2
+ n(1 − n)θψ(T̂t − T˜t )2 + nσ
κ
(πH,t )
2 + (1 − n)σ
κ∗
(π∗F,t )
2
}
. (14)
The variables ˜YH,t , ˜YF,t , ˜Tt can be interpreted as the desired targets that policy-
makers wish to achieve in a cooperative agreement for domestic output, foreign
output and the terms of trade respectively. When µ¯= 1, these targets coincide
with the flexible-price allocation assuming no mark-up shocks. (see Benigno and
Benigno, 2005, for the generalization to the case in which µ¯ = 1).
In the case in which µ¯= 1, the quadratic loss function (14) can be evaluated
by just a log-linear approximation to the structural constraints (7), (8) and (12).
By specifying a path for πH,t and π∗F,t , the variables ˆYH,t , ˆY ∗F,t and ˆTt can be
determined by (7)–(8), and this is all that is needed to evaluate (14).
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3.1. The Optimal Stabilization Plan under Commitment
We study the optimal cooperative policy under commitment from a “timeless
perspective” as discussed in Woodford (2003). This optimal plan is obtained
by minimizing the loss function of society (14) under the structural equilibrium
conditions (7), (8), and (12) together with the constraints implied by the “time-
less perspective” commitment on the initial conditions πH,t0 and π∗F,t0 given by
πH,t0 = π¯H,t0 and π∗F,t0 = π¯∗F,t0 . Equation (13) determines residually the exchange
rate. As discussed in Benigno and Benigno (2005), this minimization problem is
well behaved, that is, the loss function is convex.
Following Currie and Levine (1993) and Woodford (2003), the optimal plan can
be described using the Lagrangian method, with multiplier λ1 and λ2 associated
with the aggregate supply equations (7) and (8) and λ3 associated with equation
(13).
To study the optimal cooperative allocation in this more general case, we write
the following Lagrangian:
L = Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0(ρ + η)
[
1
2
ny2H,t +
1
2
(1 − n)y∗2F,t +
1
2
n(1 − n)θψq2t +
1
2
σn
κ
π2H,t
+ 1
2
σ(1 − n)
κ∗
π∗2F,t
]
+ nλ1,t [κ−1πH,t − yH,t − (1 − n)ψqt − βκ−1πH,t+1]
+ (1 − n)λ2,t [κ∗−1π∗F,t − y∗F,t + nψqt − βκ∗−1π∗F,t+1] + n(1 − n)λ3,t
× [qt − θ−1yH,t + θ−1y∗F,t ] − nλ1,t0−1κ−1πH,t0 − (1 − n)λ2,t0−1κ∗−1π∗F,t0 ,
where we have defined yH,t ≡ ( ˆYH,t − ˜YH,t ), y∗F,t ≡ ( ˆY ∗F,t − ˜YF,t ) and qt ≡ ( ˆTt − ˜Tt ),
and we have appropriately normalized the Lagrangian multiplier in a way to obtain
time-invariant first-order conditions. The first-order condition with respect to yH,t ,
y∗F,t , and qt are
(ρ + η)yH,t = λ1,t + (1 − n)θ−1λ3,t , (15)
(ρ + η)y∗F,t = λ2,t − nθ−1λ3,t , (16)
(ρ + η)θψqt = ψλ1,t − ψλ2,t − λ3,t , (17)
for each t ≥ t0, while the ones with respect to πH,t and π∗F,t are
(ρ + η)σπH,t = −(λ1,t − λ1,t−1), (18)
(ρ + η)σπ∗F,t = −(λ2,t − λ2,t−1), (19)
for each t ≥ t0.
We can characterize some implications of the optimal cooperative solution
without the need of solving this set of equations. Indeed, we can use equations
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(15), (16), (17), and (12) to obtain
yH,t = −λ1,t , (20)
y∗F,t = −λ2,t , (21)
which imply the following relations between producer inflation rates and output
gaps:
σ(ρ + η)πH,t = yH,t − yH,t−1, (22)
σ(ρ + η)π∗F,t = yF,t − yF,t−1. (23)
Under the optimal cooperative solution each country should adjust its domestic
producer inflation in response to changes in its domestic output gap. Equations
(22) and (23) are similar to the conditions that would hold in the closed-economy
case under commitment.
As we show in Benigno and Benigno (2005), following terms of trade shocks,
the optimal cooperative plan requires to completely offset these shocks with move-
ments in the exchange rate and the terms of trade by setting πH,t =π∗F,t = 0 in each
period. All the gaps are closed. Indeed, the first-best is achieved and the optimal
cooperative equilibrium replicates the efficient allocation.
By contrast, under inefficient supply shocks the first best cannot be achieved
and producer inflation rates are state contingent. The presence of inefficient supply
shocks creates a further distortion in the economy. Stabilizing producer inflation
rates to zero is suboptimal and a sticky price allocation can improve on the flexible
price one. However, πH,t and πF,t should move proportionally to their respective
output-gap growths.
3.2. The Transmission Mechanism of Inefficient Supply Shocks
We now focus on how inefficient supply shocks propagate across different coun-
tries. We start by considering the special case θ = ρ−1. Under this restriction, the
centralized welfare criterion can be written as a weighted average of Home and
Foreign domestic targets:
LCt = nLH,t + (1 − n)LF,t , (24)
with
LH,t = (ρ + η) · (yH,t )2 + σ(ρ + η)
κ
(πH,t )
2,
LF,t = (ρ + η) · (y∗F,t )2 +
σ(ρ + η)
κ∗
(π∗F,t )
2,
where LH,t and LF,t correspond to the loss functions that can be obtained from
quadratic approximations of the welfare of the single countries, but in a closed-
economy model, as shown in Woodford (2003). Moreover, the two aggregate
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supply equations becomes
πH,t = κ[( ˆYH,t − ˜YH,t ) + ut ] + βEtπH,t+1, (25)
π∗F,t = κ∗[( ˆY ∗F,t − ˜YF,t ) + u∗t ] + βEtπ∗F,t+1, (26)
In the optimal cooperative solution, the couple of sequences {πH,t , yH,t } and
{π∗F,t , y∗F,t } should only react to their respective inefficient supply shocks.
PROPOSITION 1. When there are inefficient supply shocks, if θρ = 1, the op-
timal paths of the producer inflation rates and output gaps in each country mirror
the one that would arise in a closed-economy model.
Inflation and output gap are orthogonal to the inefficient supply shocks of the
other country.
Using this limiting case, we now discuss the more general case in which the
condition θρ = 1 is not met. In the optimal cooperative solution, the transmission
mechanism of inefficient supply shocks depends crucially on θρ being greater or
less than 1. Using (18) and (19), we obtain
pH,t = λ1,t
σ (ρ + η) , (27)
p∗F,t =
λ∗2,t
σ (ρ + η) . (28)
Comparing with (20) and (21), it follows that the output gap in each country is
negatively related to its respective producer price level.8 Consider a positive (ad-
verse) supply shock in the Home country. As in the closed-economy counterpart,
this shock produces on impact inflation in the Home country and a reduction in
the output gap. The increase in the producer price level in country H tends to
improve the terms of trade of that country and worsen those of country F (i.e., T
decreases). The impact on foreign inflation and output gap depends on θρ. First,
assume θρ < 1 (what can be labeled as the “positive correlated scenario”). From
(8), an improvement of the foreign terms of trade increases on impact foreign
producer inflation and the foreign producer price level (not enough to offset the
initial decrease in T ). Then the foreign output gap should also decrease. Under
this scenario, an adverse shock in the Home economy will produce the same
pattern of producer inflation and output gap in both countries, still with different
magnitude.
The intuition is related to whether the worsening in the foreign terms of trade
increases or decreases the marginal revenues in utility terms of the foreign firms.
In fact, marginal revenue depends on the factor:
UC(Ct)PF,t
Pt
=
UC
[
YF,t
(
PF,t
Pt
)θ]
PF,t
Pt
,
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which represents firms’ marginal revenues in utility terms as if market were
perfectly competitive. When the elasticity of the marginal revenue with respect
to the terms of trade is positive, a worsening in the foreign terms of trade decreases
the marginal revenues since the increase in the general level of prices P offsets
the increase in the marginal utility of consumption. This is so when θρ < 1. Given
that marginal revenues fall, foreign firms should rise their prices in order to protect
their profits. The expenditure switching effect captured by the parameter θ is not
so strong to sustain a positive output gap in the foreign economy. So, output gap
in the foreign economy falls.
By contrast, when θρ > 1 (what can be labeled as the “negative correlated
scenario”), the marginal revenues of the firms increases in country F, so that
they can cut their prices on impact. The foreign output gap increases because the
expenditure-switching effect is stronger. In this case, the adverse supply shock
produces on impact inflation in the home economy and a deflation in the foreign
economy, whereas home output gap falls and foreign output gap rises. In later
quarters, the home economy will experience periods of deflation, whereas the
foreign economy will experience periods of inflation.
4. IMPLEMENTING THE COOPERATIVE SOLUTION
In this section, we investigate whether it is possible that policies acting in a
noncooperative way can implement the optimal cooperative solution. Recently,
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002) have shown that self-oriented monetary policy makers
can replicate the cooperative outcome in a decentralized framework so that there
is no need of international monetary policy coordination. In their case, “self-
oriented” refers to policymakers that maximize the welfare of the consumers
within their countries.
In a previous works [Benigno and Benigno (2003, 2005)], we have shown that in
this model there are gains from cooperation as long as θ = 1, so that self-oriented
policy makers would not behave optimally.9 In particular, in Benigno and Benigno
(2005), we have discussed how it is possible to replicate the optimal cooperative
allocation through the adoption of targeting rules.
Here we look at the problem from a different perspective. We try to design
institutions expressed in terms of loss function (rather than targeting rules) and
analyze how the assignment of these loss function to each monetary authority can
implement the cooperative solution in a strategic setting. In particular, we seek to
design objective functions for monetary policy makers that are able to commit,
but interact in strategic context.10 These objective functions do not necessarily
coincide with the utility based welfare of the country.11
Following the recent widespread adoption of inflation-targeting regimes across
several countries, we assume that each policy maker is committed to an inflation-
targeting regime. In particular, we assume that home and foreign policy maker
are committed to minimize their respective loss functions L and L ∗ of the
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form
L = E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt (ρ + η)
[
y2H,t +
σ
κ
π2H,t
]}
(29)
L∗ = E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt (ρ + η)
[
 ∗y∗2F,t +
σ
κ∗
π∗2F,t
]}
,
where  and  ∗ are nonnegative parameters.
These loss functions correspond to “flexible” inflation-targeting regimes using
the terminology of Svensson (2002), where each policy maker is penalized for the
deviations of the inflation rate from the target (zero in this case), and for changes
in the output gap. In practice, this seems a good representation of the objective
function of monetary policy maker in inflation-targeting regimes, as discussed in
Svensson (2002), and even in other regimes; see Blinder (1997) for the U.S. case.
The open-economy extension of “inflation-targeting” regimes requires an ad-
ditional qualification in terms of choosing the proper measure of inflation rate to
target, that is, whether GDP or CPI inflation. One justification for designing our
regimes in terms of GDP inflation rate follows from the works by Aoki (2001) and
P. Benigno (2004), in which the inflation coming from sectors with sticky prices is
the appropriate inflation to target when trying to minimize the distortions existing
in the economy. Moreover, we want to restrict our analysis to policy makers that are
inward-looking in the sense that their loss functions include only domestic targets.
We note here that there is another dimension along which the policy makers are
self-oriented: We assume that they interact strategically as in a Nash equilibrium
where each policy maker sets the strategy in terms of her producer inflation and
takes the strategy of the other policymaker as given.
As in Rogoff (1985), our delegation problem boils down to choosing appro-
priately the relative weights to the output gap and the producer inflation rate in
the loss function. In our case, the parameters  and  ∗ are chosen so that the
allocation that results from the strategic interaction between the policy makers
replicates the cooperative solution.
We show that there is always a positive answer to this problem. We first note that
when the only disturbances are given by terms of trade shocks, the decentralized
commitment to loss function L and L∗ reproduces the cooperative solution for any
 and  ∗. From the discussion in the previous sections, under terms of trade
shocks, stabilizing producer inflation rates to zero, in each country, achieves the
first-best. There are enough instruments to cope with all the distortions in the
economy. Because in this case there is no trade-off between domestic output-gap
and producer inflation rate, then any loss function in the class of flexible inflation-
targeting rule L and L∗ can achieve the first-best in a noncooperative allocation.
When instead there are inefficient supply shocks, the following proposition
holds:
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PROPOSITION 2. In a Nash equilibrium in which each policy maker is com-
mitted to a flexible inflation targeting policy of the form (30), following inefficient
supply shocks, the cooperative allocation can be achieved if and only if
 = θ(ρ + η) + (1 − ρθ)
θ(ρ + η) + n(1 − ρθ) ,  =
θ(ρ + η) + (1 − ρθ)
θ(ρ + η) + (1 − n)(1 − ρθ) ,
In particular  > 1 and  ∗ > 1 if ρθ < 1 and  < 1 and  ∗ < 1 if ρθ > 1. Note
that when ρθ = 1, then the cooperative allocation can be replicated if and only if
 = ∗ = 1.
When ρθ = 1 there is complete separation in the optimal stabilization plan
between Home and Foreign inefficient supply shocks. Indeed, domestic output
gap and inflation rate should react only to domestic inefficient shocks and not to
foreign ones. An inspection of the centralized welfare criterion (24) can help to
identify the appropriate design of the decentralized solution. It is sufficient that
each policy maker commits to maximize its appropriate targets, producer inflation
and output gap, in the exact combination as they are in (24). It is again worth noting
that when  = ∗ = 1 the loss functions L and L∗ correspond to the losses that
one would get as an approximation of the welfare in the closed-economy version
of this model. Because there is no strategic interdependence in the stabilization
problem, policy makers can implement the cooperative allocation by minimizing
a “closed-economy” loss function.12
We now discuss the general case, ρθ = 1. We can write equations (7) and (8)
using condition (12) as
πH,t = κ[yH,t + (1 − n)ψθ−1(yH,t − y∗F,t ) + ut ] + βEtπH,t+1, (30)
π∗F,t = κ∗[y∗F,t − nψθ−1(yH,t − y∗F,t ) + u∗t ] + βEtπ∗F,t+1, (31)
from which we can define
p1 ≡ κ[1 + (1 − n)ψθ−1], p2 ≡ −κ(1 − n)ψθ−1,
p3 ≡ κ∗[1 + nψθ−1], p4 ≡ −κ∗nψθ−1.
Combining these equations, we get
πH,t = p5yH,t + κut + p6(βEtπ∗F,t+1 − π∗F,t ) + p6κ∗u∗t + βEtπH,t+1, (32)
π∗F,t = p7y∗F,t + κ∗u∗t + p8(βEtπH,t+1 − πH,t ) + p8κut + βEtπ∗F,t+1, (33)
where:
p5 = p3p1 − p2p4
p3
, p6 = p2
p3
,
p7 = p3p1 − p2p4
p1
, p8 = p4
p1
.
In the Nash allocation, the monetary policy maker in country H maximizes L,
under the constraint (32) taken as given the sequence {π∗F,t }∞t=0 chosen by the policy
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maker in country F and the initial inflation rate given by the timeless-perspective
commitment πH,t0 = π˜H,t0 .
The first-order necessary conditions with respect to yH,t and πH,t are
yH,t = −p5ψt, (34)
σπH,t = ψt − ψt−1, (35)
at each date t ≥ 0 and for each possible state, where ψt is the Lagrangian multiplier
associated with the constraint (32). Looking at the problem of policy maker F and
maximizing L∗ with respect to yF,t and π∗F,t , we obtain that
 ∗y∗F,t = −p7ψ∗t , (36)
σπ∗F,t = ψ∗t − ψ∗t−1, (37)
at each date t ≥ 0 and for each possible state, where ψ∗t is the Lagrangian
multiplier associated with the constraint (32).
The set of equilibrium conditions (7), (8), (34), (35), (36), and (37) are equivalent
to the set of equilibrium conditions that characterize the optimal cooperative
solution if and only if  =p5 and  ∗ =p7.
Even if there is a need of monetary coordination at an international level, this
need can be satisfied by delegating monetary policy to inward-looking institutions
that care only about domestic objectives. In particular, in the “positive-correlated
scenario,” a relative higher weight should be given to the stabilization of the
domestic output gap in comparison to the scenario in which there is no strategic
interdependence across countries (ρθ = 1). The intuition for this result can be
understood by inspecting equations (30) and (31). In fact, an adverse inefficient
supply shock can be absorbed by an increase in home producer inflation, a decrease
in home output gap, and in the one-period ahead expectations on the producer
inflation rate. When ρθ < 1 and while acting strategically, each policy maker has
an incentive to lower her output gap below the foreign one in order to export the
shock to the other country, through an improvement of her own terms of trade.
This incentive creates a “contractionary” bias that can be corrected by assigning a
relatively higher weight to the output gap in the flexible inflation-targeting regime.
On the contrary, when ρθ > 1, each country would tend to be more expansionary
reducing less the output gap and increasing more the response of the producer
inflation rate. This “expansionary bias” can be corrected by giving higher weight
to the inflation rate than to the output gap in the loss function.
A final result is related to the degree of openness. The more open is a country,
that is, the more the country is affected by terms of trade movements, the higher
is the conflict in the stabilization problem. In this case, the correction should be
greater. Indeed, if, for example, n< 1/2, the home country will be more open (and
the foreign country more closed), then  >  ∗ > 1 if ρθ < 1 and  < ∗ < 1 if
ρθ > 1.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we proposed a standard two-country dynamic general equilibrium
model with imperfect competition and nominal price rigidities. Despite goods and
financial market integration, there is scope for international monetary policy coor-
dination arising from the interaction between nonunitary intratemporal elasticity
of substitution and terms of trade shocks and the presence of inefficient supply
shocks.
We show that by committing to a properly designed flexible inflation targeting
regimes our monetary authorities can replicate the optimal outcome independently
of the type of shock that hits the economy even in a strategic setting. Importantly,
these institutions are “inward-looking” in the sense that each policy maker cares
only about domestic targets—the output gap and the domestic producer inflation
rate.
NOTES
1. With producer currency pricing, and the law of one price holding, this is equivalent if expressed
in foreign currency.
2. There is indeed producer currency pricing.
3. This probability is the same for each producer and is independent of the amount of time elapsed
since her last change of price.
4. It is important to note that all the producers that belong to the same country and that can modify
their price at a certain time will face the same discounted value of the streams of current and future
marginal costs under the assumption that the new price is maintained. Thus, they will set the same
price.
5. Those deviations arise in the stochastic equilibrium in which prices are subject to the partial
adjustment rule a la Calvo.
6. A variable with a sub-index W denotes a weighted average of the Home and Foreign variables
with weights n and 1 − n, respectively. A variable with a sub-index R denotes the difference between
the Home and Foreign variables. We have defined ρ ≡ −UCCC/UC and η ≡ VyyC/Vy, while at is
defined as VyyCat = −VYξY ξY,t . a∗t is defined appropriately. The steady-state level of consumption
solve the equation UC(C) = Vy(C, 0).
7. Our approach follow the recent tradition in the open-economy literature as in Obstfeld and
Rogoff (1998, 2002), Devereux and Engel (2003), and Corsetti and Pesenti (2005). However, the latter
works have focused on static models, in which prices are preset one-period in advance and the only
source of uncertainty comes from terms of trade’s shocks.
8. Conditions (27)–(28) show that the logs of the producer price levels are stationary variables
since both the Lagrangian multipliers and the shocks are stationary. Prices should go back to the initial
level under inefficient supply shocks. This property extends directly to the nominal exchange rate.
Even if there are no direct costs in the welfare criterion (14) related to the exchange rate volatility,
a necessary condition for an allocation to be optimal is that the exchange rate should be stationary
following stationary disturbances of any nature (i.e., terms of trade or inefficient supply shocks).
9. Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2005) have explored the gains from coordination when there are
important sectorial productivity differences within a single country.
10. In a closed economy, Jensen (2002) and Woodford (1999) have studied the design of the
objective function of a monetary policy maker that is unable to fulfill credible commitments. In an
open-economy model, Sutherland (2005) compares our flexible targeting rules with simple operational
rules in a static framework.
11. See Benigno and Benigno (2005) for the analysis of the utility-based objective function of the
single country.
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12. However, in the open-economy model, these loss functions do not corresponds to the second-
order approximation of the welfare of the single countries, as the welfare of each country has an
higher weight on the disutility of output relative to the utility consumption than the centralized welfare
criterion. Indeed, the disutility of output in the centralized criterion is weighed by the size of the
country. See Benigno and Benigno (2005) for the individual welfare functions in this case.
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